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Brno University of Technology
Faculty of Information Technology
Bozˇeteˇchova 2, Brno, Czech Republic
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ABSTRACT
Currently used wireless communication technologies suffer security weaknesses that can be
exploited allowing to eavesdrop or to spoof network communication. In this paper, we present
a practical tool that can automate the attack on wireless security. The developed package
called wifimitm provides functionality for the automation of MitM attacks in the wireless
environment. The package combines several existing tools and attack strategies to bypass
the wireless security mechanisms, such as WEP, WPA, and WPS. The presented tool can
be integrated into a solution for automated penetration testing. Also, a popularization of
the fact that such attacks can be easily automated should raise public awareness about the
state of wireless security.
Keywords: Man-in-the-Middle attack, accessing secured wireless networks, password crack-
ing, dictionary personalization, tampering network topology, impersonation, phishing
1. INTRODUCTION
Recent enhancements to wireless technology
strengthen the benefits of wireless commu-
nication. It is convenient to access the net-
work from any location within the network
coverage area. For most of the portable de-
vices, this is the only way to connect to the
network. Installation and network setup are
easy, and the network is further expandable.
The main benefit of Wi-Fi, its accessibility,
makes this technology a suitable target of at-
tacks. A potential attacker needs to be in the
physical proximity of a Wi-Fi network. The
1This paper is an extended version of the original
paper that has been presented at the 9th EAI Inter-
national Conference on Digital Forensics and Cyber
Crime (Vondra´cˇek, Pluskal, & Rysˇavy´, 2018).
proposed wireless security standards aim at
prevention of such unauthorized access. Un-
fortunately, the first standard called WEP is
so weak that it is possible to crack the pass-
word in a few seconds using a conventional
laptop computer. The answer was the intro-
duction of stronger standard WPA and later
even stronger WPA2. In 2017, Mathy Van-
hoef announced that he discovered a vulner-
ability in security mechanisms that use the
four-way handshake (WPA and WPA2) and
demonstrated how easily this vulnerability
can be exploited.
The main focus of this paper is security
of wireless networks. It provides a study of
widely used network technologies and mech-
anisms of wireless security. Analyzed tech-
c© 2018 ADFSL Page 59
JDFSL V13N1 Automated Man-in-the-Middle Attack Against . . .
nologies and security algorithms suffer weak-
nesses that can be exploited to perform Man-
in-the-Middle attacks. A successful realiza-
tion of this kind of attack allows not only
to eavesdrop on all the victim’s network
traffic but also to spoof his communication
(Prowell, Kraus, & Borkin, 2010, pp. 101–
120; Callegati, Cerroni, & Ramilli, 2009).
In an example scenario (Figure 1), the
victim is a suspect conducting illegal activ-
ity on a target network. The attacker is
a law-enforcement agency investigator with
appropriate legal authorization to intercept
the suspect’s communication and to perform
a direct attack on the network. In some
cases, the suspect may be aware that his
communication can be intercepted by the In-
ternet Service Provider and harden his net-
work. For example, he could use an over-
lay network technology, e.g., VPN (imple-
mented by L2TP, IPsec (Kent & Seo, 2005,
pp. 09–10), PPTP) or anonymization net-
works (Tor, I2P, etc.) to create an encrypted
tunnel configured on his gateway, for all
his external communication. This concept
is easy to implement and does not require
any additional configuration on endpoint de-
vices. Generally, this would not be con-
sidered a properly secured network (Godber
& Dasgupta, 2003, pp. 425-431), but this
scheme, or similar, is often used by large ven-
dors like Cisco (Deal & Cisco Systems, 2006)
or Microsoft (Thomas, 2017) for branch of-
fice deployment and can also be seen in home
routers1. In such cases, intercepting traffic
on the ISP level would not yield meaning-
ful results, because all the communication is
encrypted by the hardening. On the other
hand, direct attack on the suspect’s LAN
will intercept plain communication. But,
even when an investigator is legally permit-
ted to carry out such an attack to acquire
1Asus RT-AC5300 – Merlin WRT has an option
to tunnel all traffic thought Tor.
evidence, it is scarcely used, because it re-
quires expert domain knowledge. Thus, this
process of evidence collection is very expen-
sive and human resource demanding.
Suspect Investigator
Internet
AP
ISP
Figure 1. Example forensics scenario where
the suspect has hardened his network and
uses an encrypted tunnel from the gate-
way (AP).
The aim of this research is to design, im-
plement and test a tool able to automate
the process of accessing a secured WLAN
and to perform data interception. Further-
more, this tool should be able to tamper with
the network to collect more evidence by redi-
recting traffic to place itself in the middle
of the communication and tamper with it,
to access otherwise encrypted data in plain
form. Using the automated tool should not
require any expert knowledge from the in-
vestigator.
We designed a generic framework, see Fig-
ure 3, capable of accessing and acquiring
evidence from a wireless network regardless
of used security mechanisms. This frame-
work can be split into several steps. First,
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it is necessary for an investigator to ob-
tain access to the WLAN used by the sus-
pect. Therefore, this research focuses on
exploitable weaknesses of particular secu-
rity mechanisms, see Section 2 for more de-
tails. Upon successful connection to the net-
work, the investigator needs to tamper with
the network topology. For this purpose,
weaknesses of several network technologies
can be exploited. From this point on, the in-
vestigator can start to capture and break the
encryption on the suspect’s communication.
Specialized tools focused on exploiting in-
dividual weaknesses in security mechanisms
currently used by WLAN s are already avail-
able. There are also specialized tools focused
on individual steps of MitM attacks. Tools
that were analyzed and used in implemen-
tation of the wifimitm package are outlined
in Section 2.
Based on the acquired knowledge, refer-
enced studies and practical experience from
manual experiments, authors were able to
create an attack strategy which is composed
of a suitable set of available tools. The strat-
egy is then able to select and manage in-
dividual steps for a successful MitM at-
tack tailored to a specific WLAN configura-
tion. This strategy also includes options for
impersonation and phishing for situations,
when the network is properly secured, and
the weakest part of the overall security is
the suspect.
The created software can perform a fully
automated attack and requires zero knowl-
edge. We tested the implementation on
carefully devised experiments, with available
equipment. The tool is open source and can
be easily incorporated into other software.
The main use cases of this tool are found in
automated penetration testing, forensic in-
vestigation, and education.
2. SECURITY
WEAKNESSES IN
WLAN TECHNOLOGIES
Following network technologies (Sec-
tions 2.1, 2.2), which find a significant
utilization, unfortunately, suffer from
security weaknesses in their protocols.
These flaws can be used in the process of
the MitM attack.
2.1 Wireless Security
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) is a se-
curity algorithm introduced as a part of
the IEEE 802.11 standard (Halsall, 2005,
p. 665; IEEE-SA, 2012, pp. 1167–1169). To-
day, WEP is deprecated and superseded by
subsequent algorithms, but is still sometimes
used, as can be seen from Table 1 avail-
able from Wifileaks.cz 2. Fluhrer, Mantin,
and Shamir (2001) presented that WEP is
broken. There are tools that provide access
to wireless networks secured by WEP avail-
able (Tews, Weinmann, & Pyshkin, 2007).
Regarding WEP secured WLAN s, authenti-
cation can be either Open System Authenti-
cation (OSA) or Shared Key Authentication
(SKA) (IEEE-SA, 2012, pp. 1170–1174). In
the case of WEP OSA, any station (STA)
can successfully authenticate to the Access
Point (AP) (Robyns, 2014, pp. 4–10). WEP
SKA provides authentication and security of
transferred communication using a shared
key. Confidentiality of transferred data is en-
sured by encryption using the RC4 stream
cipher. Methods used for cracking access to
WEP secured networks are based on anal-
ysis of transferred data with corresponding
Initialization Vectors (IV s).
Wi-Fi Protected Access R© (WPATM, a sub-
set of 802.11i) was developed by the Wi-Fi
Alliance R© as a reaction to increasing number
of security flaws in WEP. The WPA is de-
2http://www.wifileaks.cz/statistika/
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signed to be backward hardware compatible
with devices that used WEP, and vendors
were expected to provide a firmware update
to remedy the catastrophic situation with
WEP. Therefore, for data confidentiality and
integrity was chosen Temporal Key Integrity
Protocol (TKIP). The main flaw of WPA se-
curity algorithm is associated with the TKIP
and a four-way handshake. It can be identi-
fied at the beginning of client device’s com-
munication, where an unsecured exchange of
confidential information is performed during
the handshake. An investigator can obtain
this unsecured communication and use it for
consecutive cracking of the Pairwise Master
Key (PMK ) that is derived from Pre-Shared
Key (PSK ) or negotiated using an 802.1x
authentication stage in case of enterprise au-
thentication.
Wi-Fi Protected Access R© 2 (WPA2TM,
full implementation of 802.11i) is a suc-
cessor of WPA, but security flaws of
the WPA algorithm remain significant also
for the WPA2. Besides TKIP, WPA2
has mandatory support of Counter Mode
CBC-MAC Protocol (CCMP). Both TKIP
and CCMP ensure data confidentiality, au-
thentication, and access control. IEEE
802.11ad adds and 802.11ac extends a
new confidentiality protocol Galois/Counter
Mode Protocol (GCMP). Information ex-
posed during the handshake can be once
again used for the dictionary attack, which
can be further improved by precomputing
the PMKs (Kumkar, Tiwari, Tiwari, Gupta,
& Shrawne, 2012, pp. 37–38; Liu, Jin, &
Wang, 2010, p. 3). Precomputed lookup ta-
bles are already available online3.
A critical security flaw in wireless net-
works secured by WPA or WPA2 is the func-
tionality called Wi-Fi Protected SetupTM
(WPS ). This technology provides a comfort-
3https://www.renderlab.net/projects/
WPA-tables/
Table 1. Following table summarizes WLAN
statistics provided by Wifileaks.cz. Users of
this service voluntarily scan and publish de-
tails about WLAN s in the Czech Republic.
Information in the table show that a signifi-
cant number of WLAN s still use deprecated
security algorithms. The statistics consist-
ing of 97 192 922 measurements of 2 548 054
WLAN s were published on May 26, 2017.
Security Count Ratio
WPA2 1 429 518 56 %
WEP 393 579 15 %
WPA 375 984 15 %
open 67 388 3 %
other 281 585 11 %
Table 2. Results of wardriving in Bratislava
and Brno focused on UPC vulnerabili-
ties concerning default WPA2 PSK pass-
words (Klinec & Sv´ıtok, 2016b). Detailed
article about these security flaws is available
online (Klinec & Sv´ıtok, 2016a).
Bratislava,
Slovakia,
2016-10-01
Count Ratio
Total networks 22 172
UPC networks 3 092 13.95 %
Vulnerable
UPC networks
1 327 42.92 % UPC
Brno,
Czech Republic,
2016-02-10
Count Ratio
Total networks 17 516
UPC networks 2 868 16.37 %
Vulnerable
UPC networks
1 835 63.98 % UPC
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Server GatewayInternet ClientAttacker
Figure 2. In an example network topology suitable for realization of MitM attack, the
attacker’s device acts towards the victim as a default gateway. All the communication routed
outside the local network from the victim is sent to the default gateway, in this case to the
attacker’s device. From the attacker’s device, the communication can be further routed to
the real default gateway (Callegati et al., 2009). For the successful execution of this scenario,
the attacker needs to be connected to the targeted local network.
able and supposedly secure way of connect-
ing to the network. For a connection to
the WLAN with WPS enabled, it is possible
to use an individual PIN. However, the pro-
cess of connecting to the properly secured
network by providing PIN is very prone
to brute-force attacks (Heffner, 2011). Be-
cause WPS is a usual feature in today’s ac-
cess points and that WPS is usually turned
on by default, WPS can be a very com-
mon security flaw even in networks secured
by WPA2 with a strong password. Cur-
rently, there are already available automated
tools for exploiting WPS weaknesses, e.g.,
Reaver Open Source4.
Recently, a critical vulnerability, Key Re-
installation Attacks (KRACKs), was discov-
ered by Vanhoef & Piessens, 2017 revealing
a flaw in 801.11i and related specifications,
more precisely, in the description of the four-
way handshake. A security of CCMP and
GCMP encryption methods expects that no
Initialization Vector (IV ) repeats under the
same key. Authors showed that abusing this
vulnerability, they can reinstall a Pairwise
Transient Key (PTK ) used for generation of
Key Confirmation Key (KCK ), Key Encryp-
tion Key (KEK ), and Temporal Key (TK ).
4https://code.google.com/archive/p/
reaver-wps/
KCK and KEK are used for handshake pro-
tection and TK for data encryption. The re-
installation resets the incremental transmit
packet number (nonce) and receiver packet
number (replay counter) to the initial value.
Therefore, the reinstallation violates the ex-
pectation of non reusable IV, which conse-
quently breaks TKIP, CCMP or GCMP pro-
tocols. As Vanhoef & Piessens, 2017 show,
this also occasionally happens in regular con-
ditions, without an adversary.
Newly purchased access points usually use
WPA2 security by default. Currently, many
access points can be found using default
passwords not only for wireless network ac-
cess, but even for AP ’s web administra-
tion. With access to the AP ’s administra-
tion, the investigator could focus on chang-
ing the network topology by tampering the
network configuration. Access to the net-
work management further allows the investi-
gator to lower security levels, disable attack
detections, reconfigure DHCP together with
DNS and also clear AP ’s logs. There are
already implemented tools, which exploit re-
lations between SSIDs and default network
passwords, e.g., upc keys5 by Peter Geissler.6
5https://haxx.in/upc-wifi/
6UPC company is a major ISP in the Czech Re-
public, URL: https://www.upc.cz
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These tools could be used in an attack on
the network with default SSID to improve
dictionary attack using possible passwords.
High severity of these security flaws is also
proven by the fact that a significant amount
of WLAN s was found using unchanged pass-
words, as it is shown in Table 2.
2.2 Network Technologies
vulnerable to MitM
Man-in-the-middle attacks are possible be-
cause of the very nature of existing network
protocols. No designed for providing secu-
rity per see, the common network protocols
lack strong authentication capabilities that
would prevent their misuse by an attacker.
Man-in-the-middle attacks assume that the
attacker can divert legitimate communica-
tion. Switched Ethernet and secured wire-
less transmission separates the communica-
tion between two endpoints thus no other de-
vice should be able to see the conversation.
Fortunately for the attacker, the insecurity
of existing widely deployed protocols can be
used. At the minimum, the following proto-
cols can be considered as suitable targets:
1. DHCP automates network device con-
figuration without a user’s intervention
(Droms, 1997).
2. ARP translates an IPv4 address to a
destination MAC address of the next-
hop device in the local area net-
work (Plummer, 1982).
3. IPv6 networks utilize ICMPv6 Neighbor
Discovery functionality to achieve sim-
ilar functionality to ARP in IPv4 net-
works.
Because of the lack of authentication and
integrity checking, these protocols are vul-
nerable to spoofing attacks:
1. DHCP Spoofing generates fake DHCP
communication. This attack can also
be referred to as Rogue DHCP. An in-
vestigator can perform this kind of at-
tack to provide devices in the network
with malicious configuration, most of-
ten a fake default gateway address or
DNS address.
2. ARP Spoofing provides the network de-
vices with fake ARP messages. This
persuades the suspect’s device to be-
lieve that the attacking device’s MAC
address is the default gateway’s MAC
address.
3. IPv6 Neighbor Spoofing is a similar con-
cept to ARP Spoofing.
From the available spoofing attacks, the
ARP Spoofing technique was implemented in
our tool. This method proved itself with rea-
sonable performance during experiments and
it is simple to implement.
Of course, there are counter-measures to
spoofing attacks. The defense against spoof-
ing lies in implementing some extra function-
ality to network devices:
1. DHCP Snooping is a countermeasure
against DHCP Spoofing. This technique
focuses on detection of forged DHCP
communication. Network device acting
as a DHCP snooper accepts only DHCP
messages which are coming from con-
nections to the genuine DHCP server,
others are discarded. This way, individ-
ual connections are classified as either
trusted or untrusted. If the network
contains an unknown DHCP server be-
hind an untrusted connection, it is re-
ferred to as Spurious DHCP Server
(Cisco Systems, Inc., 2013, p. 54-2).
2. Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI ) is
based on analysis of ARP messages
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transmitted over the network with aim
to detect ARP Spoofing. Similarly, de-
vice performing DAI can have its con-
nections classified as trusted or un-
trusted. ARP messages from trusted
connections are not checked. Analyz-
ing device maintains a trusted database
of mapping of IP and MAC addresses
in the corresponding LAN. ARP mes-
sages from untrusted connections can
be verified against this trusted map-
ping database (Cisco Systems, Inc.,
2013, p. 56-2).
3. Neighbor Discovery Inspection (NDI )
uses similar approach as above-
mentioned DAI, but to detect IPv6
Neighbor Spoofing. Analyzing device
verifies information transferred in
Neighbor Discovery messages against
its database of IP and MAC ad-
dress mappings.
Although the mitigation techniques are
known, they are applied mostly in the enter-
prise environments. In SOHO networks the
devices either lack this feature or the protec-
tion is not enabled by the administrator.
2.3 Man-in-the-Middle Attack
The MitM refers to the situation, where
the attacker’s device is located in the net-
work topology between two participants of
the communication (Figure 2). The attacker
then acts as an intermediary and the net-
work traffic is routed through the attack-
ing device. This state of unauthorized and
intentionally changed network topology en-
ables the attacker to eavesdrop on passed
communication. The attacker is also able to
focus on decryption of data and on changing
the content of passed communication. That
means that the attacker can inject harm-
ful content. The attacker’s prioritized in-
tention is not only to take control over the
traffic but also to perform this attack with-
out anyone noticing it. This way, Man-in-
the-Middle Attack is endangers maintaining
confidentiality and integrity, key parts of the
CIA triad.
HTTPS uses asymmetric cryptography
with private and public keys to provide se-
cure HTTP communication. If the victim
is communicating using HTTPS, successful
realization of MitM attack is more diffi-
cult. During communication of web browser
on client’s device with a web server, these
two parties exchange a certificate contain-
ing a public key for providing a secure data
transfer. MitM attack, in this case, cap-
tures transferred certificate and replaces it
with a forged one (Callegati et al., 2009).
The forged certificate is at this point a self-
signed certificate. Upon reception of the
self-signed certificate, victim’s web browser
can show some warning concerning possi-
ble risk. If the victim is not aware of the
possible consequences, the victim can accept
the certificate. In the case of success, both
communicating devices are convinced of se-
cured HTTPS communication, but the at-
tacking device has the ongoing communica-
tion available.
DNS Spoofing focuses on possibilities
of forging DNS communication used for res-
olution of domain names and IP addresses.
For the successful realization of this attack,
the attacker needs to detect and intercept
DNS messages in the network. The aim of
this attack is to direct the victim to a differ-
ent device by providing a fake mapping of in-
quired domain name to a special IP address.
The attacker is able to imitate the inquired
service by running a similar rogue service on
the provided spoofed IP address. If the vic-
tim is convinced that the inquired service is
genuine, the attacker can then focus on cap-
turing confidential information and creden-
tials. The attacker can also use DNS Spoof-
ing for providing the real service, but with
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Accessing wireless network
Man-in-the-Middle attack
Scan Crack
Connect
Tampering network topology
stop
Capturing network traffic
stop
Impersonate
(phishing)
Figure 3. During the first phase – Accessing wireless network, the tool is capable of an at-
tack on WEP OSA, WEP SKA, WPA PSK and WPA2 PSK secured WLAN s. In a case of
the dictionary attack on the device deployed by the UPC company, used dictionaries are per-
sonalized by the implicit passwords. In the case of properly secured WLAN, impersonation
(phishing) can be employed. Using this method, an investigator impersonates the legitimate
network to obtain the WLAN credentials from the user. During the second phase – Tamper-
ing network topology, the tool needs to continuously work on keeping the network stations
(STAs) persuaded that the spoofed topology is the correct one. An investigator is now able
to capture or modify the traffic. The successful MitM attack is established.
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enclosed harmful content. DNS Spoofing can
be effectively applied for spoofing fake web-
sites (Prowell et al., 2010, p. 112). If the
attacker detects a DNS message, he inter-
cepts it and forges a reply for the victim.
The victim receives forged mapping of do-
main name to IP address and starts commu-
nication with the fake device without notic-
ing the attack. The attacker then acts as
the inquired service and therefore performs
a MitM attack.
2.4 Available Tools for
Specific Phases of the
MitM Attack on
Wireless Networks
From perspective of the intended functional-
ity of the implemented tool, the whole pro-
cess of MitM attack on wireless networks
can be divided into three main phases: Ac-
cessing wireless network, Tampering network
topology and Capturing network traffic, as
explained in Figure 3.
To access secured wireless networks,
Aircrack-ng suite7 is considered a reliable
software solution. Considering the phase Ac-
cessing wireless network (Figure 3), follow-
ing tools were utilized. Airmon-ng can man-
age modes of a wireless interface. Airodump-
ng can be used to scan and detect attacked
AP. Aircrack-ng together with aireplay-ng,
airodump-ng and upc keys can be utilized for
cracking WEP OSA, WEP SKA, WPA PSK
and WPA2 PSK. The tool wifiphisher 8 can
be used to perform impersonation and phish-
ing. Connection to the wireless network can
be established by netctl9.
MITMf 10 with its Spoof plugin can be
used during the Tampering network topology
7http://www.aircrack-ng.org/
8https://github.com/sophron/wifiphisher
9https://www.archlinux.org/packages/
core/any/netctl/
10https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/MITMf
phase. For the realization of DNS Spoofing,
it is possible to use tool dnsspoof, which is
a part of dsniff collection (Song, 2001). This
collection of network auditing and penetra-
tion testing tools contains several advanced
programs, which could be used for tamper-
ing network topology.
Capturing traffic can be done by the tool
dumpcap11, which is part of the Wireshark 12
distribution. Behaviour, usage and success
rate of individual tools, as well as possibili-
ties of controlling them by the implemented
tool, were analyzed. The software selected
for individual tasks of the automated MitM
attack were chosen from the researched va-
riety of available tools based on performed
manual experiments, further described in
the thesis (Vondra´cˇek, 2016).
3. ATTACK
AUTOMATION USING
WIFIMITM PACKAGE
AND WIFIMITMCLI
TOOL
The implemented tool is currently intended
to run on Arch Linux 13, but it could be used
on other platforms which would satisfy spec-
ified dependencies. This distribution was
selected because it is very flexible and
lightweight. Python 3.5 was selected as a pri-
mary implementation language for the auto-
mated tool and Bash was chosen for support-
ing tasks, e.g., installation of dependencies
on Arch Linux and software wrappers.
The functionality implemented in
the wifimitm package could be directly
incorporated into other software products
based on Python language. This way
11https://www.wireshark.org/docs/
man-pages/dumpcap.html
12https://www.wireshark.org/
13https://www.archlinux.org/
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requirements
access
wep
wpa2
commonimpersonation
capture model
topology
updatableProcess
wifimitmcli
Captured 
Traffic
Attack Data
Dictionaries
Figure 4. This figure shows the basic structure of the developed application. The tool
wifimitmcli uses a functionality offered by the package wifimitm. The package is also able to
manipulate attack data useful for repeated attacks and capture files with intercepted traffic.
Detailed structure of the package is described in section 3.
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Start
Capture IVs
Start
Fake 
Authentication
Needs to 
capture PRGA 
XOR?
Yes
Repeatedly deauthenticate 
stations one by one, until 
PRGA XOR is captured.
Start
ARP Replay
Start
WEP PSK 
Crack
Cracked?
No
Check process
and wait.
Yes
Stop
All
No
Figure 5. The figure shows a simplified flowchart of cracking WEP OSA or WEP SKA secured
wireless network. Cracking procedure is a part of the first phase Accessing wireless network
as described in Figure 3. If the given WLAN has already been successfully attacked, Attack
Data (Section 3.1) contains the correct key. In such cases, repetitive cracking is unnecessary
and is therefore skipped.
the package would work as a software
library. Schema of the wifimitm package is
in Figure 4.
The wifimitm package consists of following
modules. The access module offers an au-
tomated process of cracking selected WLAN.
It uses modules wep and wpa2, which imple-
ment attacks and cracking based on the used
security algorithm. The wep module is ca-
pable of fake authentication with the AP,
ARP replay attack (to speed up gather-
ing of IV s) and cracking the key based on
IV s. In the case of WPA2 secured net-
work, the wpa2 module can perform a dic-
tionary attack, personalize used dictionary
and verify a password obtained by phish-
ing (Figure 4). Verification of the password
and dictionary attacks are done with a pre-
viously captured handshake. The common
module contains functionality which could
be used in various parts of the process for
scanning and capturing wireless communi-
cation in monitor mode. The common mod-
ule also offers a way to deauthenticate STAs
from selected AP.
If a dictionary attack against a correctly
secured network fails, a phishing attack can
be managed by the impersonation14 mod-
ule. The topology module can be used to
change network topology. It provides func-
tionality for ARP Spoofing. The capture
module focuses on capturing network traf-
fic (Figure 4). It is intended to be used after
the tool is successfully connected to the at-
tacked network and network topology was
successfully changed into the one suitable for
MitM attack.
14For details concerning individual phishing sce-
narios, please see wifiphisher ’s website. https://
github.com/sophron/wifiphisher
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handshake?
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stations one by one, until 
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upc_keys
Start
WPA PSK/WPA2 PSK 
dictionary attack
Cracked?
No
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Yes
Stop
All
Personalize 
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Yes
No
No
Figure 6. This simplified flowchart illustrates cracking WPA PSK or WPA2 PSK secured
network. Similarly as cracking in Figure 5, this procedure is also a part of the first phase
Accessing wireless network (Figure 3). Cracking can also be skipped if the key is already
known. As already described, impersonation (phishing) can be used in a case of unsuccessful
cracking.
3.1 Attack Data
Various attacks executed against the selected
AP require some information to be cap-
tured first. ARP request replay attack on
WEP secured networks requires an ARP re-
quest to be obtained in order to start an at-
tacking procedure. Fake authentication in
WEP SKA secured network needs PRGA
XOR15 obtained from a detected authenti-
cation. Dictionary attack against WPA PSK
and WPA2 PSK secured networks requires
a captured handshake. Finally, for the suc-
cessful connection to a network, a correct key
is required. When the required information
is obtained, it can be saved for a later us-
age to speed up following or repetitive at-
tacks. Data from successful attacks could
be even shared between users of the imple-
mented tool.
15Stream of Pseudo Random Generation Algo-
rithm generated bits.
3.2 Dictionary Personalization
Weaknesses in default network passwords
could be exploited to improve dictionary at-
tacks against WPA PSK and WPA2 PSK
security algorithms. The implemented tool
incorporates upc keys for generation of pos-
sible default passwords if the selected net-
work matches the criteria. The upc keys tool
generates passwords, which are transferred
to the cracking tool using pipes. With this
approach, the implemented tool could be fur-
ther improved for example to support local-
ized dictionaries.
3.3 Requirements
The implemented automated tool depends
on several other tools, which are being con-
trolled. The Python package can be au-
tomatically installed by its setup includ-
ing Python dependencies. Non-Python de-
pendencies can be satisfied by installation
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ARP Replay
Process just started.
Waiting for a beacon frame.
Waiting for an ARP request.
Got ARP request, sending packets.
Process has
been terminated.
Flags
deauthenticated
read
ACKs
ARPs
sent
pps
Files
replay_arp.cap
Figure 7. This figure presents the information model of a process controlled by wifimitm.
In this example, the incorporated tool is aireplay-ng from Aircrack-ng suite executing ARP
replay attack to speed up gathering of IV s. State of the process is modeled using a FSM
consisting of 5 states. In a case that the attacking device receives at least one deauthenti-
cation packet, the deauthenticated flag is set. Statistics contain overall information about
processed packets. Useful file created by aireplay-ng during this procedure is a capture file
containing ARP request. This file is part of the Attack Data, as outlined in Section 3.1.
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Internet
STA 1 wifimitm
AP
R1
Figure 8. This figure presents the network
topology used for the first performance test-
ing (Section 4.1) and success rate measure-
ments (Section 4.2). Results of this perfor-
mance testing are in Figure 10.
scripts and wrappers, which are currently de-
veloped for Arch Linux.
MITMf has a number of dependencies.
Therefore, the installation script also cre-
ates a virtual environment dedicated to
MITMf. After installation, MITMf can be
easily run encapsulated in its environment.
Wifiphisher is also installed in a virtual-
ized environment and run using a wrap-
per. Tool upc keys is compiled during in-
stallation. Some changes in wifiphisher ’s
source code were implemented, the installa-
tion script therefore applies a software patch.
Other software dependencies are installed
using a package manager.
Due to the nature of concrete steps of
the attack, a special hardware equipment
is required. During the scanning and cap-
STA 1
Internet
R1
STA 2
STA 3
STA 4
STA 5
STA 6
STA 7
STA 8
AP
wifimitm
Figure 9. This figure shows the network
topology consisting of 8 STAs and 1 AP
which was used for the second performance
testing (Section 4.1). Results of this perfor-
mance testing are in Figure 11.
turing of network traffic without being con-
nected to the network, an attacking device
needs a wireless network interface in monitor
mode. For sending forged packets, the wire-
less network interface also needs to be ca-
pable of packet injection. To be able to
perform a phishing attack, a second wire-
less interface capable of master (AP) mode
has to be available. The user can check
whether his hardware is capable of packet
injection using the aireplay-ng tool. Man-
aging monitor mode of interface is possible
with the airmon-ng tool.
3.4 Incorporation of tools
The implemented tool needs to interact with
other software tools in order to automate
attack procedures. Incorporated tools com-
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municate using Standard output stream (std-
out), Standard error stream (stderr) and
optionally using generated files. Wifimitm
needs to continuously analyze all these out-
puts to be aware of current state of the
controlled tool. Information contained in
the output can be a summary of current
progress, a notification that some event oc-
curred or a result of an intended action.
To meet requirements for efficient incor-
poration of other tools so that the wifimitm
package could interact with them, the up-
datableProcess module was developed. This
module contains an abstract base class
UpdatableProcess. Individual incorporated
tools have dedicated classes inherited from
the UpdatableProcess which are used for
managing these tools from wifimitm. When
a process is spawned, using an instance of
class inherited from UpdatableProcess, it is
assigned a temporary directory for its out-
puts. The running process is continuously
writing to stdout and stderr. The outputs
are periodically analyzed. Classes inherited
from UpdatableProcess can implement a sig-
nalization of process’ state using a Finite
State Machine (FSM ). Process’ output can
include notifications of events. Upon detec-
tion of such event, appropriate flags can be
set. Some processes also output summary
information, which can be used to update
statistics. Continuously updated informa-
tion about the process can therefore consist
of state, flags, statistics and created files as
presented in Figure 7.
4. EVALUATION
The capabilities of the implemented tool
were evaluated. Because the tool deploys
man-in-the-middle type of attack, the tool
necessary modifies the target environment.
Thus we evaluated the footprint of the tool
and the possibility to detect the running at-
tack by the victim. The next set of experi-
ments were conducted to show how easy it is
to gain the network communication for dif-
ferent wireless configurations.
4.1 Attack’s Performance
Impact
The first experiment examines wheathe the
attack is observable from end-user perspec-
tive or disrupts regular communication on
the network. A scheme of the networks
used for this experiment is shown in Fig-
ures 8 and 9, modeling SOHO16 environ-
ment. The STAs were correctly connected to
the AP, and they were successfully commu-
nicating with the Internet. The implemented
wifimitmcli tool was then started and auto-
matically attacked the network, as described
in Section 3 and Figure 3.
The performance impact of the wifimitm
was compared using typologies presented in
Figures 8 and 9. As the observed metric was
selected a Round-Trip Time (RTT ) value
describing a delay that end-user might expe-
rience when the load on the R1 is increased.
For the first case, only one client is con-
nected at the time. The Figure 10 plots
RTT values measured between STA1 and
its Internet gateway R1. The x axe de-
notes each measurement, and on the y axe is
shown corresponding delay in ms in a loga-
rithmic scale.
The second case shows eight STAs con-
nected to R1 simultaneously, in Figure 9.
Figure 11 shows an increase of RTT mea-
sured between each of STAx and R1.
Both cases were evaluated on the fact,
whether the attack being performed was re-
vealed or whether the users had any suspi-
cion about the malicious transformation of
their WLAN. By results comparison of both
test cases, presented in Figures 10 and 11,
can be concluded that regular user has no
way of knowing whether the increase of la-
16small office/home office
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0 200 400
RTT STA1 – R1
usual communication MitM
Figure 10. The first WLAN for perfor-
mance testing was the same as for the suc-
cess rate measurements described in Sec-
tion 4.2. Figure shows comparison of
the measured RTT between STA1 and R1
during usual communication and during
successful MitM attack. The results show
the performance impact is not critical. Dis-
cussion with the users of the attacked net-
work proved this attack unrecognizable.
1 ms
10 ms
100 ms
1000 ms
10000 ms
0 200 400
RTT STA1 – R1
usual communication MitM
Figure 11. The second performance testing
consisted of 8 STAs and 1 AP connected
to the Internet – streaming videos, down-
loading large files, etc. The figure com-
pares the RTT between STA1 and R1 sim-
ilarly. The performance impact is more se-
vere than in Figure 10. Despite the perfor-
mance impact, the users had no suspicion
that they were under MitM attack. In-
stead, they blamed the amount of devices
for network congestion.
Page 74 c© 2018 ADFSL
Automated Man-in-the-Middle Attack Against . . . JDFSL V13N1
tency is caused by an attack, or by a new
device connecting to the network, massive
data transfer, or any other interference from
the physical world.
On the other hand, there is apparent lin-
ear segregation between measurements with
and without attack in Figure 11. This obser-
vation submits a future challenge, whether
this condition might be used as a feature for
a wireless network diagnostic without direct
access to R1 or any of STAs.
4.2 Experiments Concerning
Various Network Devices
and Configurations
The second experiment observes applicabil-
ity of the wifimitmcli tool in different SOHO
environments based on multiple AP devices
with a variety of commonly used security
settings in combination with numerous end-
user devices. The experiment was considered
successful if the wifimitmcli was able to per-
form all phases of MitM attack, Figure 3,
and place itself in the middle of communica-
tion to capture network traffic according to
the concept of MitM, Section 2.3 and Fig-
ure 2. For the test case to be correct, no
help from the investigator was allowed dur-
ing the attack performed by wifimitmcli.
The first use-case was to test all combina-
tions of available AP devices with all avail-
able client ones. Figure 8 shows network
topology used in this controlled laboratory
experiment. Results of the success rate mea-
surements are shown in Tables 3 and 4.
The second use-case was to test suc-
cess rate of the wifimitmcli tool in a non-
laboratory environment beyond our control
on the end-user part. Figure 8 shows once
again testing topology withLinksys WRP400
device as an AP. Table 4 shows measure-
ments and success rate of observations of this
use-case. The experiment was conducted
during the author’s presentation at the Brno
University of Technology, Faculty of Infor-
mation Technology where visitors were in-
vited to let their devices be attacked.
Results of experiments present in Ta-
bles 3, 4 and the thesis (Vondra´cˇek, 2016,
pp. 42–43) reveal the following conclusions:
• Open – networks can be very easily at-
tacked.
• WEP OSA and WEP SKA – secured
networks can be successfully attacked
even if they use a random password.
• WPA PSK and WPA2 PSK – secured
networks suffer from weak passwords
(dictionary attack), default passwords
and mistakes of users (impersonation
and phishing).
Consequently, results reveal feasibility
and ease of MitM attack using the wifim-
itm, and its success rate in the target
SOHO environments.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The goal of this research was to implement
a tool that would be able to automate all
the necessary steps to perform MitM attacks
on WLAN s. The authors searched for and
analyzed a range of software and methods
focused on penetration testing, communica-
tion sniffing and spoofing, password crack-
ing and hacking in general. To be able to
design, implement and test the tool capa-
ble of such attacks, knowledge of different
widespread security approaches was essen-
tial. The authors further focused on possibil-
ities of MitM attacks even in cases where the
target WLAN is secured correctly. There-
fore, methods and tools for impersonation
and phishing were also analyzed.
The authors’ work and research resulted
in creation of the wifimitm Python package.
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Table 3. This table presents results of the success rate measurements. A successful attack is
marked using a checkmark symbol (X) and unsuccessful attack is marked using a times sym-
bol (×). In the case when the attack was not fully successful, the question mark (?) is used.
Such partially successful test (? symbol) can for example happen in situation where the sus-
pect is sending only a portion of his traffic through the investigator. Some of the used STAs
lack WEP SKA settings ( symbol). Testing WPA PSK and WPA2 PSK networks were
configured with password ”12345678” and WEP secured networks used password ”A b#1”.
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WRT610N
open X X X X X
WEP OSA X X X X X
WEP SKA   X X X
WPA PSK X X X X X
WPA2 PSK X X X X X
Linksys
WRT54G
open X X X X X
WEP OSA X X X X X
WEP SKA   X X X
WPA PSK X X X X X
WPA2 PSK X X X X X
Linksys
WRP400
open X X X X X
WEP OSA X X X X X
WEP SKA   X X X
WPA PSK X X X X X
WPA2 PSK X X X X X
TP-LINK
TL-WR841N
open ? × X X X
WEP OSA ? × X X ×
WEP SKA   X X ×
WPA PSK ? × X X ×
WPA2 PSK ? × X X ×
D-Link
DVA-G3671B
open X X X X X
WEP OSA X X X X X
WEP SKA   X X X
WPA PSK X X X X X
WPA2 PSK X X X X X
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Table 4. The following table shows the re-
sults of public experiments. Testing network
utilized Linksys WRP400 as an AP and end-
user devices of random people that agreed
to participate in the experiment. A success-
ful attack is marked using a checkmark sym-
bol (X).
Model OS Attack
HTC Desire 500 Android 4.1.2 X
HTC Desire 820 Android 6.0.1 X
Apple iPhone 6 iOS 10.3.1 X
Apple iPhone 5s iOS 10.2.1 X
Apple iPhone 5 iOS 10.3.1 X
Apple iPhone 5c iOS 9.2.1 X
Apple iPhone 4 iOS 7.1.2 X
This package serves as a library which pro-
vides functionality for automation of MitM
attacks on target WLAN s. The developed
package can also be easily incorporated into
other tools. Another product of this re-
search is the wifimitmcli tool which incor-
porates the functionality of the wifimitm
package. This tool automates the individ-
ual steps of a MitM attack and can be
used from a CLI. The implemented software
comes with a range of additions for conve-
nient usage, e.g., a script that checks and in-
stalls dependencies on Arch Linux, a Python
setuptools setup script and of course a man-
ual page.
The wifimitmcli tool, and therefore wifim-
itm as well, was tested during experiments
with an available set of equipment. As
the results show, the implemented software
product is able to perform an automated
MitM attack on WLAN s successfully.
Upon successful deployment and execu-
tion of the implemented tool, an investigator
can eavesdrop or spoof the passing communi-
cation. The goal of the tool was to automate
MitM attacks on PSK secured WLANs. It
does not focus on dissecting further traffic
protections. This means that it does not
interfere with SSL/TLS, VPN, or other en-
capsulations. Thanks to the tool’s design, it
can be easily used together with other soft-
ware specialized on interception of encapsu-
lated traffic. Traffic encapsulation is a suf-
ficient protection against this tool. From
the WLAN administrators point of view,
available defense mechanisms are outlined
in Section 2.2.
As explained earlier, all the suspect’s net-
work traffic is passing through the attacking
device during a successful MitM attack. Un-
fortunately, there could be users on the net-
work other than the ones that are subject
to a court order. Making sure that only ap-
propriate traffic is being captured may be
important depending on the nature of the
court order or the legislation. This challenge
may be solved by setting corresponding filter
rules for traffic capture software.
This research and its products can be uti-
lized in combination with other security re-
search carried out at the Brno University
of Technology, Faculty of Information Tech-
nology. It can serve in investigations done
by forensic researchers (Pluskal et al., 2015).
It can also be used in automated penetration
testing of WLANs.
In the future iterations of the develop-
ment, the product could focus on exploit-
ing the weaknesses of the widely used WPS
technology, incorporating techniques to per-
form KRACKs, or focus on detection of at-
tacks themselves. Concerning the current
state of the product, it does not focus on
enterprise WLAN s, which also suffer from
their weaknesses.
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